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Abstract—Due to the emergent adoption of distributed systems
when building applications, demand for reliability and avail-
ability has increased. These properties can be achieved through
replication techniques using middleware algorithms that must
be capable of tolerating faults. Certain faults such as arbitrary
faults, however, may be more difficult to tolerate, resulting in
more complex and resource intensive algorithms that end up
being not so practical to use. We propose and experiment with
the use of consistency validation techniques to harden a benign
fault-tolerant Paxos, thus being able to detect and tolerate non-
malicious arbitrary faults.
Keywords—Fault tolerance, Paxos, benign faults, arbitrary
faults, consistency validation, hardening, non-malicious.
I. INTRODUCTION
Distributed systems have often been used as a basis for a
wide range of services and applications. The adoption of this
model is motivated by the need for satisfying requirements that
become indispensable as we become dependent on automated
systems, requirements such as reliability and availability. It is
quite difficult to guarantee these two properties in distributed
systems due to the possibility of partial failure of the involved
components. One of the most popular approaches to improve
a distributed system’s availability is replicating the applica-
tion [1], [2], so failures do not compromise availability because
there are several replicas providing the same application.
Reliability is more difficult to guarantee, because the replicated
application must not have its state or part of it corrupted when
facing a failure.
There are several factors that make it more difficult to
synchronize the application state between replicas. The eas-
iest to diagnose causes usually are communication problems,
crashes or power failures, that prevent a replica from being
updated. However, there are other causes that may be much
harder to diagnose, such as data corruption, that may cause the
replica to display erroneous behavior and incorrect results. It
is useful to classify those faults into two main classes: benign
faults and arbitrary faults [1], [2]. The first class represents
faults that are related to the use of software and hardware
components that may stop working at any given time, but
they do not deviate from expected behavior. As for the second
class, it represents any fault where the components may display
any type of behavior, including behavior caused by external
malicious attackers.
One of the most well known techniques to implement repli-
cation in a consistent way is through active replication. In this
model the application can report to the client application that
the operation has succeeded only when a minimum number of
replicas has committed the change [3], [1], [2]. The minimum
number of replicas varies according to the algorithm used
and the fault model tolerated. Active replication has been the
focus of research when developing middleware for distributed
applications. Several solutions such as Paxos [4], leases [5]
and viewstamp [6] are implemented in active replication mid-
dleware with each its particular approach [7].
Paxos [4] supports benign faults in the crash-recovery
model [2] , where a replica stops working for a certain period
of time and later is able to recover itself. In order to accomplish
this, Paxos uses persistent memory to save its state and recover
in the event of a crash. Paxos guarantees that subsequent
updates will force the replica to update its state. Even though
Paxos is perfectly tolerant to benign faults, some of the faults
mentioned previously are able to compromise its reliability
and availability properties. One way of dealing with these
faults is hardening the fault model, changing the algorithm
appropriately.
A Paxos algorithm adapted for the arbitrary faults class [8],
[9] is much more costly than its counterpart for the benign
faults class, for the following reasons:
1) It performs more message exchanges and disk oper-
ations;
2) It requires that no more than a third of replicas fail;
3) Its usage of encryption increases system’s over-
head [10];
4) Its implementation is complex [10], [11];
5) It requires deployment of different platform and ap-
plications versions (heterogeneity) [12], [10];
6) The increase in number of replicas reduces its per-
formance and may cause an increase in error occur-
rence [12], [11].
Among the faults tolerated by the algorithm in the arbitrary
faults class, there are several types of faults that are not
malicious and are relatively common to distributed applica-
tions [13], [12], such as:
1) Network failures: data corruption during transmis-
sion;
2) Hardware failures: corrupt read/write operations on
main memory or secondary storage;
3) Programmer failure: error in algorithm implementa-
tion;
4) Operator failure: erroneous behavior due to incorrect
configuration.
It is possible to improve a benign algorithm to tolerate the
previously mentioned faults, and by choosing to not tolerate
malicious faults it is possible to achieve a non-malicious
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arbitrary fault tolerant algorithm that may be less costly than
the arbitrary one, as presented in [11], [12]. In this paper
we show how to harden the benign crash-recovery Paxos
through consistency validation techniques used to detect non-
malicious arbitrary faults, like redundancy [11], integrity [12]
and semantic [10] validations. Our main contribution is that
we apply these strategies at the middleware level, allowing any
application built on top of the middleware to be automatically
hardened.
In order to implement, test and validate this work, we
use a Paxos-based Java library known as Treplica [14], [15].
We used fault injection techniques to test and validate the
implementation. We were able to harden the originally im-
plemented benign crash-recovery fault model to a crash-stop
non-malicious arbitrary fault model by being able to detect the
previously mentioned arbitrary faults. The end result is that any
application built on top of the hardened Treplica is crash-stop
non-malicious arbitrary fault tolerant.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In
Section II we describe fault models and Paxos under benign
fault class. In Section III we describe some arbitrary fault class
consensus algorithms and their limitations. In Section IV we
describe our approach and in Section V we present the results.
We talk about related work in Section VI and finally conclude
in Section VII.
II. REPLICATION UNDER BENIGN FAULTS
In distributed systems we use the concept of fault models to
abstract the properties a system must satisfy and which faults
a distributed algorithm for this system must tolerate. For the
benign faults class, there are two classic fault models [2], [3]
that draws our attention:
1) crash-stop: replicas that fail are removed from the
algorithm permanently;
2) crash-recovery: replicas that fail can recover and
continue to participate in the algorithm;
The fault models above range from weaker (more strict)
to stronger (more general). The stronger the model, the more
complex and difficult it is to implement an algorithm. When
building a practical distributed system, it is desirable to adopt
a fault model that better fits the system and satisfies its
requirements for performance and types of faults it must
tolerate, but this is not always the case, since any distributed
system that relies on actual computers is prone to arbitrary
faults.
A. Active Replication
Distributed applications built on top of active replication
middleware are modeled as deterministic finite state machines.
Each system operation is modeled as a state transition, where a
state consists in a set of information that includes the previous
state and a transition to the current state. Each replica is a
state machine on its own and the algorithm makes use of total
order broadcast to propagate the transitions in a consistent
way. Ultimately, all replicas are kept synchronized in the same
state because their transition messages are processed in the
same order [2], [3], using an atomic broadcast or consensus
algorithm.
B. Paxos
Paxos is a consensus-based active replication algorithm
proposed for asynchronous systems augmented with failure
detectors [2]. Paxos also assumes a crash-recovery fault model
that tolerates benign faults [4]. Replicas agree on a certain
value or operation through voting, the decision determines
what operation is executed on all replicas. A voting round
consensus is reached when the coordinator receives successful
votes from the majority of replicas, then the decision is
broadcast.
In order to satisfy the reliability and availability properties,
Paxos must recover its state when a replica fails. Its approach
to accomplish this is to save a log of all its operations in
persistent memory, including proposals, votes and decisions,
so when the application is restarted, it is able to replay the log
and get back to the state prior to the crash.
III. REPLICATION UNDER ARBITRARY FAULTS
According to literature [2], the fault models for arbitrary
faults class include:
3) fail-arbitrary: similar to crash-recovery, but replicas
must tolerate any failure (benign and arbitrary);
Many algorithms solve consensus (and active replication)
in the fail-arbitrary fault model. One of the first was described
as “The Byzantine Generals Problem” [16]. This paper studies
the problem where war generals try to reach an agreement
while one of them is a traitor. Due to this work, the fault
model is often referred to as Byzantine faults.
In the proposed algorithm, several rounds of voting through
encrypted message exchanges are required to detect malicious
replicas, where the quorum size increased from the single
majority required from the crash-recovery model to more than
two thirds of replicas to ensure consensus. The first practical
Byzantine algorithm used Paxos in the crash-stop model [3],
and later a more robust solution was published [9], where
the crash-recovery Paxos is able to tolerate arbitrary faults.
This more robust solution made use of Message Authenti-
cation Codes (MACs), real-time assumptions, communication
protocol through the file-system, and optimizations such as
reconfiguration, garbage collection and state transfer.
Lamport analyzed the algorithm in [9] and proposed in
[8] a more general version of the algorithm, derived directly
from Paxos. The new more general algorithm makes use of
digital signatures and is changed so that all replicas exchange
proposal, vote and decision messages. Although it solves
the “Byzantine Generals Problem”, its increased performance
impact and the fact that malicious faults are being tolerated
through solutions orthogonal to distributed systems middle-
wares [10], [12], contributed to its low-adoption in practical
distributed systems. Byzantine Paxos has also been criticized
for the following problems:
1) Although faults are tolerated, it may not be possible
to find out the cause [10], [12];
2) If there is no heterogeneity in the system, operator
and programmer faults cannot be detected [12], [10];
3) Increasing the number of replicas reduces perfor-
mance and possibly increases fault incidence [12],
[11];
4) If more than a third of replicas fail, it is not possible
to detect that the system has been compromised [3].
IV. NON-MALICIOUS ARBITRARY PAXOS
Many practical distributed system implementations desire
to tolerate arbitrary faults, but would prefer a less performance
intensive algorithm than a byzantine one [10], [12], [11].
While malicious faults are being tolerated using different
techniques [10], [12], and based on the premise that any fault
model can be hardened to tolerate some arbitrary faults, it is
possible to harden the crash-recovery benign model to tolerate
non-malicious arbitrary faults, thus achieving the following
fault model, as shown in Figure 1:
4) fail-arbitrary non-malicious: similar to fail-arbitrary,
but malicious faults are not tolerated by the algorithm.
An algorithm for the above fault model is considered to
be less complex than a fail-arbitrary one for not tolerating
malicious faults in its implementation. However, the imple-
mentation required to tolerate all non-malicious arbitrary faults
adds its own complexity to the algorithm.
Fig. 1. Representation of non-malicious arbitrary faults class amidst other
classes.
A. Consistency Validation
Non-malicious arbitrary fault types are present not only in
any practical distributed system, but in any system that relies
on computer components. These faults are tolerated through
various approaches, such as:
1) Data and state redundancy [10], [12], [17], [18]: each
process variable or stored data has a duplicate which
can be used for validation and backup;
2) Checksums and hashes [10], [12], [18], [17]: gener-
ating a checksum or hash of data and attaching it to
the protocol messages prior to transmitting across the
network or saving them in storage allows for future
detection of undesired corruption;
3) Integrity checks [10], [12], [18], [17]: validate data
integrity on each read and write operation, usually
making use of redundant data;
4) Semantic checks [10]: validate that after an operation
has been applied on data, the newly obtained state is
semantically correct according to the applied opera-
tion. For instance: after adding an element to a list,
check if the element is in the list;
5) Arithmetic codes [11]: numerical properties of data
are used to detect undesired corruption. For instance:
If numerical variables are multiplied by a prime
number upon writing and divided by the same number
when they are read back, the remainder should always
be zero.
Each approach mentioned above has its overhead cost
associated, for either performing repeated checks, encrypting,
or doubling memory requirements due to redundancy. We
decided to create a unique set of validation techniques to
harden the Paxos algorithm, looking for the ones that best
match the software architecture of the middleware used.
B. Treplica
Treplica [14], [15] is a library coded in Java that allows
distributed applications to use Paxos as middleware to manage
state replication through its state machine. Its implementation
is very close to a traditional Paxos [4] implementation. In
Treplica, replicas can assume any Paxos role, such as Coordi-
nator, Proposer, Learner and Acceptor. Applications designed
according to the Model-View-Controller standard can easily
be modeled to use Treplica. We chose Treplica because its
modular architecture allows for improvements to be easily
coded and tested. Since it is designed to tolerate benign faults,
upon analysis we validated that it is prone to non-malicious
arbitrary faults we are interested in, due to:
1) Reading and Writing serialized binary files to the
storage, which can become corrupt on storage failure;
2) Usage of UDP protocol for message exchanges,
which can be corrupted on noisy network channels;
3) Usage of Java virtual machine, which can have its
process memory space corrupted at runtime.
Additionally, Treplica is object oriented and makes use of
immutable objects design, where an object is never changed
after being instantiated. This allows for more efficient use of
checksums. State transition semantic checks can also be easily
coded by the application due to its integration with the state
machine modelling.
C. Hardening the benign crash-recovery fault model
Our main approach to harden our existing benign crash-
recovery fault model towards the fail-arbitrary non-malicious
one is to employ consistency validation checks to detect
arbitrary faults, while initially not worrying about how to
recover from them. From the point of view of a benign fault
model distributed system, most arbitrary faults behave as silent
faults because they cannot be detected. For instance, if a user
clicks a button to buy one book, but a replica processes that
two books have been bought because bits got flipped along the
way, then this is not a fault from Paxos point of view, because
the message was delivered consistently across all replicas. In
order to effectively detect such silent faults, we employed the
following techniques:
1) Data corruption detection: We often check for data
corruption as soon as it can be detected. Whenever an im-
mutable Paxos message object is instantiated, either to be
written to persistent storage or propagated to the network, we
calculate a checksum of its contents and append to it. When the
message is received or recovered from storage, the checksum is
recalculated and validated by comparing it to the one attached.
We acknowledge that recalculating a hash every time some
data is read adds overhead, but Treplica’s modular architecture
allowed us to identify key locations in the source code to
minimize overhead. Through this implementation we were able
to detect any corruption that affects messages, such as network
messages, persistent storage and main memory corruption.
2) State integrity checks: We also attempt to detect ap-
plication state corruption by having a duplicate state and
by maintaining a current state checksum. Every time a state
transition takes place, we apply the transition operation to both
states, then we call a method implemented by the application
that should return an object that best describes its current state.
This allows for any transition operation that silently fails and
causes the states to diverge to be detected before any further
harm is done. Both states are also validated every time the
application state object is requested, since they can become
corrupt any time due to memory corruption. The current state
checksum is recalculated after each successful state transition
based on the object’s data and the previous checksum. This
checksum allows for state integrity validation between replicas,
either by including it in the protocol or opportunistic messages.
3) Semantic checks: We introduced semantic validation
that helps detect main memory corruption and programmer
errors. For each state transition operation implemented by the
application, it is enforced to implement a semantic validation
method that verifies if the transition has been correctly applied
to the state. This semantic validation method is run as soon as
the state transition is applied, thus if the validation fails, all
further operations on the given replica are halted.
V. EXPERIMENTAL VALIDATION
The main purpose of testing our implementation is to
validate whether the hardened Treplica is more fault tolerant
than the unmodified Treplica. By injecting faults in the un-
modified Treplica, we could observe the behavior caused by
them, such as crashes, lock-ups and erroneous behavior, which
properties they compromise and which faults the hardened
Treplica should be tolerant to.
A. Fault Injection
In order to test our implementation through fault injec-
tion, we used an aspect-oriented library, known as AspectJ.
It allows us to change the behavior of any Java program
without changing its main code. Our technique was to generate
corruption faults on the message protocols and state transitions
through byte flips and value changes that would attempt to pass
undetected through our validation. The same fault injection
code is also compatible with the unmodified Treplica, so we
could easily compare it to our hardened version. We coded
all fault injections separately and added probability settings,
which allows us to control the rate at which each fault is
injected.
For protocol messages, we change a random value in the
message as soon as the message is received from the network
or recovered from storage, while retaining the checksum value
on the hardened Treplica. The protocol message fault injections
are then detected before processing the message. We created an
example application built on top of Treplica, that consists of a
list of strings. We injected faults in the state by either removing
or adding elements, and by changing the string themselves.
The application method that returns the state description was
able to capture the differences caused by the fault injections on
the following transition, by comparing to the duplicate state.
Transition fault injections consisted of not doing the transition
operation, which were also captured by the duplicate states
and subsequently by the semantic checks. The resulting code
work flow for the experiment execution on a replica can be
seen in the diagram shown in Figure 2.
Fig. 2. Experiment code work flow running with fault injection in Treplica.
B. Analysis
By injecting the above faults into the original Treplica, we
were able to confirm that reliability and availability proper-
ties were compromised. For protocol message injections, the
replicas would not only display benign faults such as lock-ups
and crashes, but also perform incorrect application operations,
vote in incorrect rounds, and flood the network with invalid
round messages. Other faults injected did not affect Paxos,
but they significantly affected the application state consistency,
noticeable by the client. Our hardened Treplica however, was
able to detect all the faults injected. Through fault injection
we were also able to detect bugs in our implementation that
did not appear during our regular testing.
Diagnosing faults was a challenge on its own. A storage
corruption resulted on the same replica failing over and over
because it was reading corrupt data every time it restarted.
A corrupt network message can be dropped, thus becoming a
benign failure. Main memory corruption was found to be the
most difficult to cover, test and diagnose.
Our fault detection techniques on messages received and
recovered prevent a replica from processing and further spread-
ing a fault that originated in a different replica or in storage.
We can list two types of faults that could still be propagated:
1) The highly unlikely case of data corruption between
instantiating the immutable object and generating its
checksum (or generating an incorrect checksum), for
this scenario we are not taking any action;
2) Main memory corruption in internal Paxos state,
which can lead to erroneous behavior, like a replica
getting lost between voting rounds, voting incorrectly
or the Coordinator starting invalid voting rounds.
Although not yet implemented, our analysis indicates
that using hashes for this type of validation would
degrade system performance greatly, thus we are
considering a different approach, in which replicas
would analyze each other’s messages received to
detect erroneous behavior.
According to our analysis, we believe that upon detecting
the faults, the most effective approach to recover a replica
from most arbitrary faults is to transfer a fault-free state from
another replica, resetting the replica to a pristine state in the
distributed system’s state machine. However, our solution so
far has been to shutdown the replica instance because Treplica
currently does not have a state transfer feature implemented.
This solution would result in a crash-stop non-malicious ar-
bitrary fault model instead of the one we initially intended
to achieve. There is only a limited number of faults we can
recover from while we do not have state transfer feature.
Figure 3 displays what fault tolerance we achieved in our
experiment.
We consider the crash-stop non-malicious arbitrary fault
model to be more resilient and more practical than the original
crash-recovery implementation. If a benign fault occurs, the
system is able to recover itself and continue, but if a non-
malicious arbitrary fault is detected and is non-recoverable, we
shutdown the replica, preventing any propagation of erroneous
behavior.
Fig. 3. Hardening plan starting from crash-recovery towards crash-recovery
non-malicious arbitrary fault model.
VI. RELATED WORK
Other research has been published trying to achieve ar-
bitrary non-malicious fault tolerance through several different
approaches. The most common approach observed is to harden
a less tolerant fault model towards the most tolerant one by
covering each type of fault present in the arbitrary fault class
individually. It also seems to be the case where the use of
hashes or Message Authentication Codes (MACs) to provide
validation checks is one of the most plausible solution to
several types of faults.
In [12], an in-depth non-malicious arbitrary faults study
is presented. Many of this paper techniques are inspired by
this work. The approach taken was to develop a library that
hardens processes built on top of it. All the process’ messages,
event handlers and variables, if implemented according to the
library, are managed by it as part of its state. It intercepts all
messages and event handlers to perform integrity checks on
them, and aborts whenever a fault is detected. This library is
not a middleware, but it can be used to harden existing benign
fault tolerant middlewares if implemented on top of the library.
Our approach takes an existing middleware and explores the
challenges of hardening the middleware itself.
In [10], although it discusses several concepts on detecting
arbitrary faults, it only implements semantic checks. This is
similar to part of our approach, with a low coverage because
the checks are implemented only at the application layer.
The approach presented in [11] involves the use of a low-
level encoding compiler so processes read, write and perform
all operations with encoded arithmetic values. Whenever a
value is changed due to corruption, the arithmetic decoding
operation fails and process detects it. Arbitrary faults handling
is mapped to benign faults, so processes either crash or have
their messages discarded. This approach also sacrifices error
coverage for better performance due to the use of arithmetic
codes.
VII. CONCLUSION
Among the fault models used to build distributed systems,
crash-recovery and fail-arbitrary stand out for benign and
arbitrary fault classes, respectively. There is a big difference in
types of faults tolerated and also in resource requirements for
each of those fault models, where fail-arbitrary has not been
the preferred model. It is possible to propose a set of consis-
tency validation techniques that allows benign crash-recovery
algorithms to be hardened towards the same coverage as fail-
arbitrary algorithms while not considering malicious faults. By
implementing and experimenting with those techniques on a
Paxos-based library, we hardened our fault model, successfully
detecting non-malicious arbitrary faults and achieving a crash-
stop non-malicious arbitrary fault model by shutting down
the replica once a fault is detected. Our work currently does
not recover from such faults, but at this point, we consider
the crash-stop non-malicious arbitrary fault model to be more
resilient and more practical than fail-arbitrary, also requiring
less effort on developers to create a fault tolerant application
for this fault model using such middleware.
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